Abstract Efficient allocation of indivisible goods is an important problem in mathematical economics and operations research, where the concept of Walrasian equilibrium plays a fundamental role. As a sufficient condition for the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium, the concept of gross substitutes condition for valuation functions is introduced by Kelso and Crawford (1982) . Since then, several variants of gross substitutes condition as well as a discrete concavity concept, called M ♮ -concavity, have been introduced to show the existence of an equilibrium in various models. In this paper, we survey the relationship among Kelso and Crawford's gross substitutes condition and its variants, and discuss the connection with M ♮ -concavity. We also review various characterizations and properties of these concepts.
Introduction
The problem of efficiently allocating indivisible (or discrete) goods is one of the main research topics in economics and operations research. Auction with multiple differentiated goods is a typical example of efficient allocation of goods. In recent years, there has been a growing use of auctions for goods such as spectrum licenses in telecommunication, electrical power, landing slots at airports, etc. A fundamental concept in the allocation problem is Walrasian equilibrium, which is a pair of an allocation of goods and a price vector satisfying a certain property.
Walrasian equilibrium
We explain the concept of Walrasian equilibrium using the auction market model. Let us consider an auction market with n types of goods, denoted by N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, which are to be allocated to m buyers (or bidders, consumers, etc.). We have u(i) ∈ Z + units available for each good i ∈ N . We denote the integer interval as [ 
Gross substitutes condition
Although a Walrasian equilibrium possesses a variety of desirable properties as an allocation of goods, it does not always exist. Kelso and Crawford [21] showed that in the case where each good is available by single unit (i.e., u = 1), a Walrasian equilibrium always exists under a natural assumption on buyers' valuation functions, called gross substitutes condition. We say that a valuation function f = f b satisfies gross substitutes condition if it satisfies the following:
(GS) ∀p, q ∈ R n with p ≤ q, ∀x ∈ D(f, p), ∃y ∈ D(f, q):
y(i) ≥ x(i) (∀i ∈ N with q(i) = p(i)).
Intuitively, the condition (GS) means that a buyer still wants to get items that do not change in price after the prices of other items increase. Since the concept of the gross substitutes condition is introduced by Kelso and Crawford [21] , this condition has been widely used in various models such as matching, housing, and labor markets (see, e.g., [2, 5-7, 16, 17, 23] ) and has become a benchmark condition in auction design. Kelso and Crawford [21] also proposed an auction procedure (i.e., an algorithm) to compute an equilibrium (see also [18] ). Gul and Stacchetti [17] proposed two conditions equivalent to the condition (GS), and showed that (GS) is also "necessary" condition for the existence of an equilibrium in the sense that if one of buyers' valuation functions violates the condition (GS), then an equilibrium does not exist in general. The condition (GS), however, is not sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium in the multi-unit case where multiple units are available for each type of goods (see Section 8 for such an example).
In the multi-unit case, Danilov, Koshevoy, and Murota [9] made an attempt to obtain a general sufficient condition for the existence of an equilibrium corresponding to the concept of concavity for divisible goods, and showed the existence of an equilibrium by assuming a concept of discrete concavity for valuation functions, called M ♮ -concavity * . A function f : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} is said to be M ♮ -concave if it satisfies the following exchange property:
(M ♮ -EXC) ∀x, y ∈ dom f , ∀i ∈ supp + (x − y), ∃j ∈ supp − (x − y) ∪ {0}:
where dom f = {x ∈ Z n | f (x) > −∞}, supp + (x) = {i ∈ N | x(i) > 0}, supp − (x) = {i ∈ N | x(i) < 0} for x ∈ Z n , χ i is the characteristic vector of i ∈ N , and χ 0 = 0. The concept of M ♮ -concavity is introduced by Murota and Shioura [29] as a variant of M-concavity by Murota [25] , and plays a central role in the theory of discrete convex analysis, which is a theory of discrete convexity/concavity for functions on integer lattice points (see [27, 28] ).
Since then the relationship between M ♮ -concavity and the gross substitutes conditions has been discussed in the literature. The first important result, given by Fujishige and Yang [16] , is the equivalence between M ♮ -concavity and (GS) for valuation functions on {0, 1} n (i.e., single-unit case). Then, Murota and Tamura [35] and Danilov, Koshevoy, and Lang [8] independently investigated the connection between M ♮ -concavity and the gross substitutes condition; in particular, stronger variants of gross substitutes condition are introduced in [35] and in [8] to characterize M ♮ -concavity (labeled as (PRJ-GS) and (SWGS), respectively, in this paper; see Section 4) . Another stronger variant of gross substitutes condition is also considered by Milgrom and Strulovici [24] which is obtained by regarding every unit of goods as distinct goods; the condition is labeled as (SS) in Section 4.
Aim of this paper
In this paper, we survey the relationship among Kelso and Crawford's gross substitutes condition (GS) and other variants of gross substitutes condition by Murota and Tamura [35] , Danilov, Koshevoy, and Lang [8] , and Milgrom and Strulovici [24] . Especially, our focus is mainly on multi-unit valuation functions (i.e., functions on integer lattice points) which appear in several recent papers [8, 15, 24, 35] , while single-unit valuation functions (i.e., functions on 0-1 vectors), which are often dealt with in the literature, are also considered as an important special case. We investigate the relationship among gross substitutes conditions from the viewpoint of discrete convex analysis. In particular, we reveal the connection of gross substitutes conditions with M ♮ -concavity, and clarify polyhedral structure of gross substitutes valuation functions. We also explain the connection with other conditions such as the single improvement condition and submodularity, and present characterizations in terms of indirect utility function. For most of theorems and propositions shown in this paper, we provide rigorous proofs from the viewpoint of discrete convex analysis for a better understanding of the connection between gross substitutes conditions and discrete concavity.
The organization of this paper is as follows. In Section 2, we present various examples of valuation functions which satisfy M ♮ -concavity, most of which often appear in mathematical economics. It turns out from the results shown in Section 4 that these functions are also examples of gross substitutes valuation functions.
In Section 3, we explain some definitions and notation necessary in this paper. We also review some fundamental results in (discrete) convex analysis which are relevant to this paper. Readers may skip this section and refer to it when necessary.
The main results in this paper are given in Section 4, where we present variants of gross substitutes condition and their connection with M ♮ -concavity. In addition to the gross substitutes conditions (GS), (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), and (SS) mentioned above, we also consider the following simple condition which is obtained by adding to (GS) an extra inequality:
(GS&LAD) ∀p, q ∈ R n with p ≤ q, ∀x ∈ D(f, p), ∃y ∈ D(f, q):
The extra inequality i∈N y(i) ≤ i∈N x(i) means that if prices are increased, then a buyer wants less items than before. We also give characterizations of gross substitutes valuation functions in terms of the polyhedral structure of their concave closures. In this and following sections, we put all proofs at the end of each section so that readers not interested in proofs can skip them. In Section 5, we consider the single improvement condition introduced by Gul and Stacchetti [17] and its stronger variant, and discuss the relationship with gross substitutes conditions.
Submodularity for valuation functions is recognized as an important property in mathematical economics. In Section 6, we show that gross substitutes conditions imply submodularity, and also provide a characterization of gross substitutes conditions using submodularity to clarify the difference between two properties. Given a valuation function and a price vector for goods, the indirect utility function is defined as the maximum value of the valuation of a bundle of goods minus the bundle's total price. The indirect utility function represents the structure of the corresponding valuation function from the dual viewpoint (i.e., viewpoint of prices). In Section 7, we investigate the structure of gross substitutes valuation functions through indirect utility functions, and give some characterizations.
As an application of the results presented in this paper, we discuss the existence and computation of a Walrasian equilibrium in Section 8. We show that the assumption of gross substitutes conditions implies the existence of an equilibrium and makes it possible to compute an equilibrium by a simple algorithm.
In Appendix, we give rigorous proofs of the theorems on characterizations of supermodularity and submodularity of polyhedral convex functions given in Section 3.3 for readers' convenience.
Examples of Valuation Functions
We present various examples of valuation functions which satisfy M ♮ -concavity (hence they also satisfy gross substitutes conditions such as (GS) and (GS&LAD)). See [27, Chapter 6] and [28] for more examples of M ♮ -concave valuation functions. The first three examples below show some simple classes of M ♮ -concave valuation functions which often appear in mathematical economics, while more complex classes of M ♮ -concave valuation functions are presented in the latter four examples. Example 2.1 (additive (linear) valuations). An additive valuation function is defined as a function
where a ∈ R 
where a ∈ R n + and B ∈ R + is a real number representing the budget of a buyer. A budgeted additive valuation is not M ♮ -concave in general, while it is M ♮ -concave if all values a(i) are the same. Example 2.3 (unit-demand valuations). Suppose that a buyer wants to buy at most one good. Then, it is natural to consider a valuation function defined as
where a ∈ R n + . Such a function is called a unit-demand valuation function. Instead, we may consider the following valuation function, where a function takes a finite value at the zero vector or any unit vector:
Remark 2.4. Suppose that a buyer is "single-minded," i.e., the buyer wants to buy a specific set S * ⊆ N of goods, and finds no value for any other sets. In such a case, we often use a valuation function f :
where α > 0 and χ S is the characteristic vector of S ⊆ N . This function is called a single-minded valuation function; single-minded valuation functions are not M ♮ -concave in general.
Instead, we may consider a valuation function g :
with α > 0. This function satisfies M ♮ -concavity. Example 2.5 (symmetric concave valuations). A valuation function f :
n is called symmetric if there exists a univariate function φ : 
which is called a laminar concave function [27] (also called S-valuation in the preprint version of [5] ). Every laminar concave function is an M ♮ -concave function. Example 2.7 (Maximum-weight bipartite matching and its extension). Consider a complete bipartite graph G with two vertex sets N and J, where N and J correspond to workers and jobs, respectively. We assume that for every (i, v) ∈ N × J, profit w(i, v) ∈ R + can be obtained by assigning worker i to job v. Consider a matching M ⊆ N × J between workers and jobs which maximizes the total profit. Define f :
where ∂ N M denotes the set of vertices in N covered by edges in M . Then, f is an M ♮ -concave function. Such f is called an OXS valuation in [23] .
We consider a more general setting where each i corresponds to a type of workers and there are u(i) ∈ Z + workers of type i. In a similar way as above, we can define a function f :
This f is an M ♮ -concave function. A much more general example of M ♮ -concave functions can be obtained from the maximum-weight network flow problem (see [27] ).
Example 2.8 (quadratic functions). Let
is M ♮ -concave if the matrix A satisfies the following condition:
In particular, a quadratic function f : [27] . Example 2.9 (weighted rank functions). Let I ⊆ 2 N be the family of independent sets of a matroid, and w ∈ R n + . Define a function f :
which is called the weighted rank function. If w(i) = 1 (i ∈ N ), then f is the ordinary rank function of matroid (N, I). Every weighted rank function is M ♮ -concave [28] .
Preliminaries
In this section we explain the definitions of various concepts and notation used in this paper, and review some fundamental results in (discrete) convex analysis which are relevant to this paper. Readers may skip this section and refer to it when necessary.
Definitions and notation
We denote by R the set of reals and by Z the set of integers. Also, denote by R + the set of nonnegative reals and by Z + the set of nonnegative integers. Throughout this paper, let n be a positive integer and denote N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The characteristic vector of a subset
In particular, we use the notation 0 = χ ∅ , 1 = χ N , and χ i = χ {i} for i ∈ N . We also denote
For vectors x, y ∈ R n , the inequality x ≤ y denotes the component-wise inequality, i.e., it means that
For any set S ⊆ R n , the convex closure of S, denoted by conv(S), is the smallest closed convex set containing S.
Let f : R n → R∪{±∞} be a function defined on R n . The effective domain of f , denoted by dom f , is the set
The sets of maximizers and minimizers, denoted by arg max f and arg min f , respectively, are defined by
arg max f and arg min f can be empty sets. For a vector p ∈ R n , we define the function
For a function f : Z n → R ∪ {±∞} defined on the integer lattice points Z n , we also define dom f , arg max f , arg min f , and f [p] in a similar way.
For vectors x, y ∈ R n , denote by x ∧ y, x ∨ y ∈ R n the vectors such that
is said to be supermodular if it satisfies the following supermodular inequality:
where we admit the inequality +∞ ≤ +∞ (or −∞ ≤ −∞). Similarly, a function f is said to be submodular if it satisfies the following submodular inequality:
That is, f is submodular if and only if −f is supermodular. We also define supermodularity and submodularity for functions f :
defined on the integer lattice points in a similar way.
Basic concepts in convex analysis
We explain basic concepts in convex analysis and show some properties of polyhedral convex functions which are relevant to this paper; see [38] for more accounts. While we consider functions defined on R n in this section, some of the concepts explained below naturally extend to functions defined on Z n by regarding them as functions f with dom f ⊆ Z n . Let f : R n → R ∪ {±∞} be a function. The epigraph of f is the set given as
We say that f is convex if its epigraph is a convex set in
A convex function is said to be polyhedral convex if its epigraph is a polyhedron in
Note that
For a function f : R n → R ∪ {±∞}, the convex closuref : R n → R ∪ {±∞} and the concave closuref : R n → R ∪ {±∞} of f are defined by
For any x ∈ dom f and d ∈ R n , we define the directional derivative of f at x with respect to d by
For a polyhedral convex function f : R n → R ∪ {+∞}, a linearity domain of f is a nonempty subset of dom f given as arg min f [−p] for some p ∈ R n . Similarly, a linearity domain of a polyhedral concave function f : R n → R ∪ {−∞} is a nonempty subset of dom f given as arg max f [−p] for some p ∈ R n .
Fundamental results in discrete convex analysis
Discrete convex analysis is a theory of discrete convexity/concavity for functions on integer lattice points (see [25] [26] [27] [28] 
It is easy to see from its definition that an L
♮ -concave function is a supermodular function, while M ♮ -concavity implies submodularity.
♮ -concavity and L ♮ -concavity, originally defined for function on Z n , are generalized to polyhedral concave function [27, 30] . A polyhedral M ♮ -concave function is defined by a condition similar to (M ♮ -EXC); see [27, 30] for a precise definition of polyhedral M ♮ -concavity. For a polyhedral concave function g : R n → R ∪ {−∞}, we say that g is a polyhedral L ♮ -concave if it satisfies the following condition:
A polyhedral L ♮ -concave function g is said to be integral if each linearity domain g is an integral polyhedron, i.e., for every x ∈ R n , the set arg max g [−x ] is an integral polyhedron if it is not empty. A function g : 
Algorithm M ♮ Steepest Ascent Up
Step 0: Let x := x 0 be a vector in dom f such that x * ≥ x 0 for some maximizer x * of f .
Step 1: Find j ∈ N ∪ {0} that maximizes f (x + χ j ).
Step 2: If f (x + χ j ) ≤ f (x), then output x and stop [x is a maximizer of f ].
Step 3: Set x := x + χ j and go to Step 1.
Algorithm L ♮ Steepest Ascent Up
Step 0: Let p := p 0 be a vector in dom g such that p * ≥ p 0 for some maximizer p * of g. 
given by a pair of submodular/supermodular functions ρ :
It is known that g-polymatroids can be characterized by their edges. Recall that an edge is a 1-dimensional face of a polyhedron.
Theorem 3.9. A pointed polyhedron is a g-polymatroid if and only if every edge of the polyhedron is parallel to a vector +χ
If ρ and µ are integer-valued, then S is an integral polyhedron; in such a case, we say that S is an integral g-polymatroid. An M ♮ -convex set is the set of integral vectors in an integral g-polymatroid.
We say that a function f :
Hence, a function f is concave-extensible if and only if the concave closuref :
.g., [27, Chapter 5] for the original definition of L ♮ -convex polyhedron).
Theorem 3.11. A polyhedral concave function
We consider the maximization of the sum of two M ♮ -concave functions and give an optimality criterion. Note that the sum of two
We then explain the relationship between M ♮ -concavity and L ♮ -concavity. The concave conjugate of an M ♮ -concave function has L ♮ -concavity, and this property characterizes M ♮ -concavity of a function.
concave if and only if its conjugate function f
• : R n → R ∪ {−∞} is polyhedral L ♮ -concave. (ii) If f is an integer-valued M ♮ -concave function, then f • is an integral polyhedral L ♮ -concave function (i.e.
, a polyhedral L ♮ -concave function such that each linearity domain is an integral polyhedron).
We finally present some theorems on characterizations of supermodularity and submodularity of polyhedral convex functions in terms of linearity domains. It should be noted that dom f is assumed to be full-dimensional in Theorem 3.14, while such an assumption is not required in Theorems 3.15 and 3.16. Theorem 3.14. Let f : R n → R ∪ {+∞} be a polyhedral convex function such that dom f is an n-dimensional polyhedron. Then, the following three conditions are equivalent:
iii) every linearity domain of f can be represented by a system of inequalities of the form
Then, the following three conditions are equivalent:
(iii) every linearity domain of f can be represented by a system of inequalities of the form a ⊤ x ≤ b with b ∈ R and a ∈ R n satisfying |supp + (a)| ≤ 1 and |supp − (a)| ≤ 1. These theorems were proven in the paper by Danilov and Lang [10] in Russian, and referred to in the paper by Danilov, Koshevoy, and Lang [8] without proofs. For readers' convenience, we provide rigorous proofs of the theorems in Appendix.
Gross Substitutes Conditions and Their Connection with Discrete Concavity
In this section we present several variants of gross substitutes condition and discuss their connection with the concept of M ♮ -concavity in discrete convex analysis. We also give characterizations of gross substitutes valuation functions in terms of the polyhedral structure of their concave closures. Proofs of theorems are given at the end of this section.
Throughout this paper, a function f :
n is called a single-unit valuation function to put emphasis on the fact that only one unit is available for each type of goods.
Gross substitutes condition and its stronger variants
For a valuation function f :
The original definition of gross substitutes condition by Kelso and Crawford [21] is as follows, where f :
In addition to (GS), we consider four variants of gross substitutes condition, each of which is stronger than the original condition. The first two conditions (PRJ-GS) and (SWGS), called projected gross substitutes condition and step-wise gross substitutes condition, are introduced by Murota and Tamura [35] and Danilov, Koshevoy, and Lang [8] , respectively.
, at least one of (i) and (ii) holds true:
It is easy to see that (PRJ-GS) with p 0 = q 0 = 0 implies (GS).
The third variant is the following condition introduced by Murota, Shioura, and Yang [33] :
Note that the condition (GS&LAD) coincides with (PRJ-GS) if p 0 = q 0 = 0. The condition (GS&LAD) can also be seen as a combination of (GS) and the condition called the law of the aggregate demand (see [24] ; see also [19] ):
The forth variant of gross substitutes condition, called the strong substitute condition [24] , is defined as follows, where the effective domain of a valuation function is assumed to be contained in the set Z 
Using the function f B , the strong substitute condition is described as follows: (SS) The function f B given by (4.1) satisfies the condition (GS). Finally, recall that a function f :
Note that the condition (M ♮ -EXC) is "price-free," i.e., it does not use price vectors p and q.
We show that each of the conditions (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), and (SS) is equivalent to M
♮ -concavity under some natural assumption. While the condition (GS) is weaker than the other conditions in general, it is also equivalent to the others for single-unit valuation functions.
Recall that a function f : Z n → R∪{−∞} is concave-extensible if and only if the concave closuref :
Suppose that f is concave-extensible and dom f is bounded. Then, the following equivalences hold:
in addition, then each of the four conditions is equivalent to the condition (SS). (ii) Suppose that dom f ⊆ {0, 1}
n . Then, the following equivalences hold:
. We see that each of the five conditions in Theorem 4.1 (i) implies (GS), while the converse does not hold in general, as shown in the following example. Example 4.2. There exists a multi-unit valuation function which is concave-extensible and satisfies (GS), but satisfies none of (M ♮ -EXC), (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), and (SS).
It is not difficult to see that f is concave-extensible and satisfies (GS). We also have
Hence, f does not satisfy the condition (M ♮ -EXC) with x = (0, 1) and y = (2, 0), i.e., f is not M ♮ -concave. By this fact and Theorem 4.1 (i), f satisfies none of (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), and (SS).
Based on the theorem and the example above, in the following sections we refer to each of the conditions (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), and (SS) as a strong gross substitutes condition for multi-unit valuation functions, and (GS) as the weak gross substitutes condition.
While M ♮ -concavity is a stronger condition than (GS), they are equivalent for some classes of valuation functions. One such class is single-unit valuation functions, as shown in [26, 27] for the original definition of M-concave functions). Hence, Theorem 4.3 can be regarded as the equivalence between M-concavity and (GS).
The following relationship holds for M-concave and M ♮ -concave functions (see, e.g.,
is M-concave. Based on this relationship and the equivalence between M-concavity and (GS) in Theorem 4.3, Murota and Tamura [35] introduced the condition (PRJ-GS) by reformulating the condition (GS) forf in terms of the original function f . Remark 4.5. The assumption of concave-extensibility used in Theorem 4.1 (i) is a natural assumption for multi-unit valuation functions since the gross substitutes condition for valuations of indivisible items is a counterpart of concavity condition for valuations of divisible items, and every single-unit valuation function is concave-extensible.
Indeed, either of the conditions (GS), (PRJ-GS), and (GS&LAD) is not enough to obtain a good property of valuation functions for multi-unit valuation functions, without the assumption of concave-extensibility. For example, every univariate function with bounded domain satisfies the conditions (GS), (PRJ-GS), and (GS&LAD); this means that none of (GS), (PRJ-GS), and (GS&LAD) implies a good property for univariate functions.
More variants of gross substitutes condition
We also consider the following variant of the condition (GS), where the price vector q in (GS) is restricted to a vector of the form p + λχ k with k ∈ N and λ > 0:
Similarly, we consider the following variant of (GS&LAD):
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(GS&LAD
The following property can be shown easily by a simple inductive argument. Proposition 4.6. For a function f :
. We consider another variants of (GS) and (GS&LAD), where the roles of p (resp., x) and q (resp., y) are interchanged:
function. (i) Suppose that f is concave-extensible and dom f is bounded. Then, f satisfies the condition (GS&LAD − ) if and only if it satisfies (GS&LAD). (ii) Suppose that dom f ⊆ {0, 1}
n . Then, f satisfies (GS − ) if and only if it satisfies (GS). For multi-unit valuation functions which are not concave-extensible, the condition (GS − ) (resp., (GS&LAD − )) is independent of (GS) (resp., (GS&LAD)) in general, as shown in the following examples. Example 4.8. We show an example of a function which satisfies (GS − ) but not (GS). Let f :
In a brute-force manner, we can check that f satisfies the condition (GS − ). We show that f does not satisfy the condition (GS). For p = (0, 0, 0) and q = p + εχ 3 with ε > 0, we have
That is, (GS) does not hold for f . On the other hand, the function g :
is an example of a function which satisfies (GS) but not (GS − ). Example 4.9. We show an example of a function which satisfies (GS&LAD) but not
Note that dom f is bounded and f is not concave-extensible. It is not difficult to see that f satisfies (GS&LAD).
We show that f does not satisfy the condition (GS&LAD − ). For q = (0, 0) and p = q − εχ 2 with ε > 0, we have
On the other hand, the function g :
is an example of a function which satisfies (GS&LAD − ) but not (GS&LAD).
Polyhedral structure of gross substitutes valuations
We investigate the polyhedral structure for the concave closure of a gross substitutes valuation function. Note that the concave closuref : R n → R ∪ {−∞} of a valuation function f given by (3.1) is a polyhedral concave function if the effective domain of f is bounded.
Recall that a linearity domain S ⊆ R n of a polyhedral concave function g : R n → R ∪ {−∞} is a set given as
for some vector p ∈ R n . Consider the following conditions in terms of linearity domains of the concave closuref :
(1DLD) Every 1-dimensional linearity domain off is parallel to a nonzero vector 
Suppose that dom f is bounded and f is concave-extensible. Then, the following relations hold:
n . Then, all the six conditions in (ii) are equivalent. For multi-unit valuation functions which are not concave-extensible, neither (LD) nor (1DLD) implies (GS&LAD) in general, as shown in the following example. Example 4.11. We show an example of a multi-unit valuation function which satisfies both of (LD) and (1DLD) but not (GS&LAD).
Let f :
It is not difficult to see that f satisfies both of (LD) and (1DLD) since the concave closurē f of f is given asf We also show that (1DLD ′ ) implies none of (GS) and (1DLD) for multi-unit valuation functions. Example 4.12 (Danilov, Koshevoy, and Lang [8, Example 6] ). We show an example of a multi-unit valuation function which satisfies (1DLD ′ ) but none of (GS) and (1DLD). Let f :
Note that this function f is nondecreasing and concave-extensible, and the concave closurē f :
We see that every 1-dimensional linearity domain off is parallel to one of the vectors in
Note that every vector v in this set satisfies |supp
. We show that f does not satisfy the condition (GS). For p = (3/2, 1, 1/2) and q = p+εχ 3 with 0 < ε < 1/2, we have If supp − (x−y) = ∅, then we are done since supp + (x−y) = {k} holds. Hence, we assume h ∈ supp − (x − y) holds for some h ∈ N \ {k}. Then, in a similar way as in the discussion above with the roles of x and y changed, we can show that x(i) ≥ y(i) for all i ∈ N \ {h}, which, together with (4.4), implies x(i) = y(i) for i ∈ N \ {h, k}. From this follows that supp + (x − y) = {k} and supp
Proof of "(GS&LAD) =⇒ (1DLD)". The proof below is similar to that for the implication "(GS) =⇒ (1DLD ′ )" shown above. Let S ⊆ R n , x, y ∈ S, k ∈ N , p ∈ R n , and δ > 0 be as in the proof of "(GS) =⇒ (1DLD ′ )." Then, the condition (GS&LAD) implies that
If y(i) = x(i) holds for all i ∈ N \ {k}, then we are done since x − y is parallel to χ k . Hence, we assume x(h) < y(h) for some h ∈ N \ {k}. Then, in a similar way we can show that
which, together with (4.5), implies
From this follows that x − y is parallel to +χ k − χ h . Hence, (1DLD) holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.10 (ii)
The equivalence between (M ♮ -EXC) and (LD) is immediate from 
Proof of "(M ♮ -EXC) =⇒ (GS&LAD)". Let p, q ∈ R n be vectors with p ≤ q, and let x ∈ D(f, p). Let y * ∈ D(f, q) be a vector such that ∥y * − x∥ 1 is the minimum among all vectors in D(f, q). To show the condition (GS&LAD), we prove that y * satisfies the following:
Assume, to the contrary, that there exists some k ∈ N such that q(k) = p(k) and
Hence, we have
Hence, the former condition in (4.6) holds.
Proof of Theorem 4.10 (iii)
Since single-unit valuation functions have bounded effective domains and are concaveextensible, we can apply Theorem 4.10 (ii). Hence, it suffices to show that the implication "(1DLD ′ ) =⇒ (1DLD)" holds for single-unit valuation functions. Let S ⊆ R n be a 1-dimensional linearity domain off . Since S is a 1-dimensional bounded polyhedron, there exist two distinct vectors x, y ∈ S which are extreme points of S. By (1DLD ′ ), the vector v = x − y satisfies |supp where the second equivalence follows from Theorem 4.10 (iii) proved in Section 4.4.3 and the fact that f B is a single-unit valuation function, and the third equivalence follows immediately from the definition of the condition (SS).
Proof of "(SWGS) =⇒ (1DLD)". The proof is similar to that for "(GS&LAD) =⇒ (1DLD)" in Section 4.4.1. Let S ⊆ R n be a 1-dimensional linearity domain off . Since dom f is bounded and f is concave-extensible, there exists some p ∈ R n such that S is equal to the convex closure conv (D(f, p)) of D(f, p) . Let x, y ∈ S be the extreme points of S. Then, we have x, y ∈ D(f, p), and S is parallel to x − y. We show that the vector x − y is parallel to a nonzero vector +χ i − χ j with i, j ∈ N ∪ {0}.
Since x ̸ = y, we may assume that x(k) > y(k) for some k ∈ N . The condition (SWGS) applied to p ∈ R n , k ∈ N , and x ∈ D(f, p) implies that there exist some δ ≥ 0 and
where the first inequality is by z ∈ D(f, p + δχ k ) and the second by x(k) > y(k). Hence, it holds that f [−p](z) ≥ f [−p](y), which, combined with y ∈ D(f, p), implies z ∈ D(f, p).
Since conv(D(f, p)) = S is a 1-dimensional polyhedron with extreme points x and y, the vector z can be expressed as a convex combination of x and y. This, together with (4.7), implies that
If y(i) = x(i) holds for all i ∈ N \ {k}, then we are done since (4.8) implies that x − y is parallel to +χ k . Hence, we assume x(h) < y(h) for some h ∈ N \ {k}. Then, in a similar way as in the discussion above with the roles of x and y changed, we can show that
which, together with (4.8), implies
From this follows that x − y is parallel to +χ k − χ h .
Proof of "(M
If λ * = +∞, then (i) in (SWGS) holds. Hence, we assume λ
♮ -concave function. Hence, Theorem 3.5 implies that
if and only if
which can be rewritten as
Since x ∈ D(f, p), the inequality (4.9) holds with λ = 0, i.e., we have
Hence, the value λ * is given as
Proof of Theorem 4.7
We can prove the equivalence between (GS&LAD − ) and M ♮ -concavity in the same way as in the proof of the equivalence between (GS&LAD) and M ♮ -concavity in Section 4.4.2. Hence, we obtain the equivalence between (GS&LAD − ) and (GS&LAD). In a similar way, we can prove the equivalence between (GS − ) and (GS) for single-unit valuation functions.
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Single Improvement Condition and Gross Substitutes Condition
In this section, we discuss the relationship between gross substitutes conditions and some variants of the single improvement condition.
Theorems
The following condition, called the single improvement condition in Gul and Stacchetti [17] , states that if a vector x is not a maximizer of the function f [−p], then we can find a vector with a larger function value of f [−p] in a "neighborhood" of x.
A stronger variant of the single improvement condition, which we call the strong single improvement condition, is considered in Murota and Tamura [35] .
It turns out that under some mild assumptions, the condition (SI) is equivalent to (SSI) and strong gross substitutes conditions (i.e., (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), and (SS)).
Theorem 5.1. Let f : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} be a function. (i) Suppose that dom f is bounded. Then, the following relations hold: (SSI) =⇒ (SI) =⇒ (GS&LAD). (ii) Suppose that dom f is bounded and f is concave-extensible. Then, the following relations hold: (SSI) ⇐⇒ (SI) ⇐⇒ (GS&LAD). (iii) Suppose that dom f ⊆ {0, 1} n . Then, the following relations hold: (SSI) ⇐⇒ (SI) ⇐⇒ (GS&LAD) ⇐⇒ (GS).
For valuation functions which are not concave-extensible, the converse of the two implications in Theorem 5.1 (i) does not hold in general. We can check that f satisfies (SI). On the other hand, if we take p = (0, 0), x = (−1, 0), and y = (1, 0), there exists no i ∈ supp 
Proofs 5.2.1. Proof of Theorem 5.1 (i)
It is not difficult to see that (SSI) implies (SI). It is shown that (SI) implies (GS&LAD ′ ) which is equivalent to (GS&LAD) by Proposition 4.6. To prove (GS&LAD ′ ) for f , we first show that (SI) implies the following property which is slightly stronger than (SWGS):
(SWGS+) ∀p ∈ R n , ∀k ∈ N , ∀x ∈ D(f, p), at least one of (i) and (ii) holds true:
We then prove (GS&LAD ′ ) for f by using (SWGS+).
If λ = +∞, then we are done; the condition (i) in (SWGS+) holds. Hence, we assume λ < +∞, and show that the condition (ii) in (SWGS+) holds. By the definition of λ, it holds that
Since x ∈ D(f, p + λχ k ) and dom f is bounded, there exists a sufficiently small ε > 0 such that
We show that the vector y = x − χ i * + χ j * satisfies the desired conditions. By (5.3), it holds that 
and x ∈ D(f, p).
We show the existence of a vector y ∈ Z n with
Such y can be found by the following algorithm which is based on (SWGS+):
Step 0: Let t = 1, x 1 = x and λ 1 = 0.
Step 1: If x t ∈ D(f, p + λχ k ) holds, then output y = x t and stop. Otherwise (i.e., x t ̸ ∈ D(f, p + λχ k )), go to Step 2.
Step 2: Find λ t+1 ∈ R + with λ t+1 ≥ λ t and x t+1 ∈ D(f, p + λ t+1 χ k ) such that
(5.7)
Step 3: Set t := t + 1 and go to Step 1.
The algorithm terminates in a finite number of iterations since the value x t (k) decreases in each iteration and dom f is bounded. Suppose that the algorithm terminates at the r-th iteration.
We first show by induction that λ t < λ holds for t = 1, 2, . . . , r. Suppose that λ t < λ holds for some t ≤ r − 1. Since the algorithm does not stop in the t-th iteration,
We then show the correctness of the algorithm. The existence of λ t+1 and x t+1 in Step 2 follows from (SWGS+) since λ t < λ, x t ∈ D(f, p + λ t χ k ), and
Step 1, then the condition (5.7) for t = 1, 2, . . . , r − 1 implies that y = x r satisfies (5.5).
Proof of Theorem 5.1 (ii) and (iii)
By Theorem 5.1 (i), we need to prove that (GS&LAD) implies (SSI) in the case where dom f is bounded and f is concave-extensible.
Suppose that f satisfies (GS&LAD). By Theorem 4.
, the following condition holds:
The proof is given by induction on the value ∥x − y∥ 1 . If y = x − χ i + χ j holds for some i ∈ supp + (x − y) ∪ {0} and j ∈ supp − (x − y) ∪ {0}, then we have (5.8) immediately. Hence, we may assume the following condition:
. If the former holds, then we have the claim (5.8). Hence, we assume the latter holds.
Put y ′ = y + χ i − χ j , where y ′ ̸ = x by (5.9). We have
Hence, the induction hypothesis implies that there exists
we have the claim (5.8).
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Submodularity and Gross Substitutes Condition
In this section, we discuss the relationship between gross substitutes conditions and submodularity for valuation functions. Recall that a valuation function f : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} is said to be submodular if it satisfies
where we admit the inequality of the form −∞ ≥ −∞. This inequality is equivalent to the following local submodular inequality under some mild assumption on dom f :
Recall that an M ♮ -convex set is the set of integral vectors in an integral g-polymatroid; see Section 3.3.
is a submodular function if and only if it satisfies (6.2). Remark 6.2. Let f : Z
n → R ∪ {−∞} be a function such that dom f is contained in a hyperplane of the form x(N ) = λ for some λ ∈ Z. Then, f satisfies the submodular inequality (6.1) since for every distinct x, y ∈ Z n at least one of x ∧ y and x ∨ y is not in dom f . This observation shows that we need some additional assumption on dom f to derive some meaningful (or useful) property from the submodular inequality (6.1).
Theorems
The gross substitutes condition (GS) implies submodularity of valuation functions. Note that the converse of the statements above does not hold in general, i.e., the class of gross substitutes valuation functions is a proper subclass of submodular valuation functions. Example 6.4. A budgeted additive valuation function considered in Remark 2.2 is a submodular function, while it does not satisfy the condition (GS) in general.
For example, by setting n = 3, a = (1, 1, 2), and B = 2, we obtain the following budgeted additive valuation function:
It can be easily checked that f is a submodular function. For p = (0.5, 0.5, 1) and q = (0.5 + δ, 0.5, 1) with a sufficiently small δ > 0, we have It is natural to ask which property distinguishes gross substitutes valuation functions from submodular valuation functions. The following theorem gives a characterization of the gross substitutes condition by the combination of submodularity and an additional property.
Suppose that dom f is bounded and f is concave-extensible. Then, f satisfies the condition (GS&LAD) if and only if it is a submodular function satisfying the following condition:
3)
where i and j can be the same.
(ii) Suppose that dom f ⊆ {0, 1} n . Then, f satisfies the condition (GS) if and only if it is a submodular function satisfying (6.3).
Proofs 6.2.1. Proof of Proposition 6.1
In the proof we use the following property of an M ♮ -convex set.
Proof. Since S is an M
♮ -convex set, it can be described as
implying that z ∈ S. Hence, the claim follows.
To prove Proposition 6.1, it suffices to show that local submodular inequality (6.2) implies submodularity. We prove the submodular inequality for x, y ∈ Z n by induction on the value ∥x − y∥ 1 .
Hence, we assume x ∧ y ∈ dom f and x ∨ y ∈ dom f . Since dom f is an M ♮ -convex set, this assumption, together with Proposition 6.6, implies that [
We may also assume that
since otherwise the submodular inequality follows immediately from the local submodular inequality. We here consider the former case only; the latter case can be dealt with similarly.
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Let k ∈ supp − (x − y). Then, it holds that
Hence, the induction hypothesis implies that
From (6.4) and (6.5) we obtain f (
Proof of Theorem 6.3
We here give a proof based on a polyhedral property of valuation functions with (GS). By Theorem 4.10 (i), function f satisfies the condition (1DLD ′ ), i.e., every 1-dimensional linearity domain of the concave closuref of f is parallel to a nonzero vector v ∈ R n with |supp
Since the concave closuref is a polyhedral concave function, Theorem 3.15 implies thatf is a submodular function, from which follows that f is also a submodular function since it is concave-extensible.
Proof of Theorem 6.5
Our proof of Theorem 6.5 is based on the following characterization of an M ♮ -concave function by a local exchange property:
concave if and only if it satisfies the following local exchange property:
∀x, y ∈ dom f with ∥x − y∥ 1 
We first prove a refined version of this characterization for M ♮ -concave functions f with 0 ∈ dom f ⊆ Z n + by using Theorem 6.7.
♮ -concave if and only if it satisfies (6.2), (6.3), and the following inequality
Proof. We see that the local exchange property in Theorem 6.7 is equivalent to the combination of (6.2), (6.3), (6.6), and the following inequality:
By Theorem 6.7, it suffices to show that (6.3) implies the inequality (6.7).
In the following, we denote a(s, t) = f (x + χ s + χ t ) ∈ R ∪ {−∞} and b(s) = f (x + χ s ) ∈ R ∪ {−∞} for every s, t ∈ N . Then, the inequality (6.7) can be rewritten as which is proved below by a case-by-case analysis. We may assume
since otherwise the inequality (6.8) holds immediately. By Proposition 6.6, this assumption, combined with 0 ∈ dom f ⊆ Z n + , implies that b(s) > −∞ for s ∈ {i, j, k, h}. By the condition (6.3), we may assume, without loss of generality, that
(6.9)
We consider six inequalities
The condition (6.3) implies that • either (6.10) or (6.11) (or both) holds, • either (6.12) or (6.13) (or both) holds, • either (6.14) or (6.15) (or both) holds. Hence, it suffices to consider the following four cases:
Case 1: (6.10) holds, Case 2: (6.11) and (6.12) hold, Case 3: (6.13) and (6.14) hold, Case 4: (6.11), (6.13), and (6.15) hold. In Case 1, the inequalities (6.9) and (6.10) imply
i.e., the first inequality in (6.8) holds. In Case 2, the inequalities (6.11) and (6.12) imply
i.e., the second inequality in (6.8) holds. We can also obtain the first inequality in (6.8) from (6.13) and (6.14) in a similar way in Case 3. We finally consider Case 4. From (6.9), (6.11), (6.13), and (6.15) follows that
i.e., (6.8) holds. This concludes the proof.
We now prove Theorem 6.5, where only the claim (i) is proven since the claim (ii) follows from (i) and the equivalence between (GS) and (GS&LAD) for single-unit valuation functions shown in Theorem 4.1 (ii).
Let f : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} be a concave-extensible function such that dom f is a bounded M ♮ -convex set. By Theorem 4.1 (i) and Theorem 6.8, f satisfies (GS&LAD) if and only if it satisfies (6.2), (6.3), and (6.6). This implies the claim (i) of Theorem 6.5, since (6.2) is equivalent to submodularity by Proposition 6.1 and concave-extensibility implies (6.6).
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Indirect Utility Functions of Gross Substitutes Valuations
For a valuation function f : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} with nonempty bounded dom f , the indirect utility function (also referred to as the dual profit function [24] ) is a function f
The value f IU (p) of the indirect utility function represents the maximum utility of a buyer with a valuation function f at a given price vector p. The indirect utility function f IU is essentially equivalent to the concave conjugate f
• of a valuation function in the following sense:
In this section, we show various properties and characterizations of indirect utility functions associated with gross substitutes valuation functions.
Theorems
Any strong gross substitutes condition for a valuation function (i.e., (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), or (SS)) can be characterized by another discrete convexity concept for the indirect utility function, called L ♮ -convexity. Recall that a polyhedral convex function g : R n → R ∪ {+∞} is said to be polyhedral L ♮ -convex if it satisfies the following condition:
This inequality with λ = 0 implies the submodularity of g, in particular. Hence, L ♮ -convexity is a stronger condition than submodularity. 
Theorem 7.2 shows the equivalence between (GS) and submodularity of the indirect utility function for a single-unit valuation function. It is natural to ask whether this equivalence extends to the case of multi-unit valuation functions. If a multi-unit valuation function satisfies a strong gross substitutes condition such as (GS&LAD), then its indirect utility function is polyhedral L ♮ -convex by Theorem 7.1, and therefore it is submodular. In fact, submodularity of the indirect utility function can be obtained from the weak gross substitutes condition (GS). . We show an example of a function which does not satisfy the condition (GS), while the function is concave-extensible and its indirect utility function is submodular. Consider the function f in Example 4.12, which does not satisfy (GS). Then, the indirect utility function f IU : R 3 → R is given as
where vectors x j are given as follows:
The formula (7.2) follows from the fact that every extreme point of linearity domains of f is in {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x 8 }. Then, we can show by using ( Statement A. Let f : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} be a function such that dom f is a finite integer interval. Then, f satisfies the condition (GS) if and only if its indirect utility function g : R n → R given by (7) is submodular.
As pointed out in Example 7.4, the "if" part of Statement A does not hold in general for multi-unit valuation functions, while the "only if" part holds true. 
Note that the condition ( * ) for some linearity domain S of f IU implies the same condition ( * ) for each face of S, which is also a linearity domain of f IU . Hence, it suffices to prove the condition ( * ) for all full-dimensional linearity domains of f IU . Since f IU is the indirect utility function of function f with dom f ⊆ {0, 1} n , each fulldimensional linearity domain S of f IU is associated with some χ X ∈ dom f and given as
Since f IU is submodular, Theorem 3.16 implies that each facet of S is orthogonal to a nonzero vector v with |supp
is a facet-defining inequality for S. Hence, the polyhedron S can be rewritten as
This shows that S satisfies the condition ( * ).
Proof of Theorem 7.3
We give two proofs of Theorem 7.3. The first proof is based on Theorem 3.16, a characterization of submodularity for polyhedral convex functions, while the second proof shows the submodularity of f IU directly. In the proofs, the following properties of f IU are used. Proposition 7.6. For p ∈ R n , it holds that
Proof. We see from the definition of the concave closure (3.1) and the linear programming duality that the valuef (x) can be represented as a convex combination of values f (y) (y ∈ dom f ). Hence, we have
The equation (7.4) follows from (7.3) and Theorem 3.3.
First Proof
Since f satisfies (GS), it follows from Theorem 4.10 (i) that f satisfies the condition (1DLD ′ ), i.e., every 1-dimensional linearity domain of the concave closuref is parallel to a nonzero vector v ∈ R n with |supp + (v)| ≤ 1 and |supp − (v)| ≤ 1. By (7.3), the condition (1DLD ′ ) is equivalent to the following condition for f IU : every (n − 1)-dimensional linearity domain S ⊆ R n is orthogonal to a nonzero vector v ∈ R n with |supp + (v)| ≤ 1 and |supp − (v)| ≤ 1, which, combined with Theorem 3.16, implies that f IU is submodular since f IU is a polyhedral convex function.
Second Proof
Since f IU is a polyhedral convex function with dom f = R n , it is not difficult to see that the following three conditions are equivalent:
. Based on this equivalence, we will prove below that the condition (iii) holds.
By Theorem 3.2 and (7.4), we have 5) where the last equality is by the fact that arg maxf [−p] is equal to the convex closure conv
The condition (GS) implies that for every
By (7.5), (7.6), and (7.7), we have (
e., the condition (iii) holds.
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Application to Walrasian Equilibrium
As an application of the results presented in this paper, we discuss the existence and computation of a Walrasian equilibrium.
Walrasian equilibrium
We consider an auction market model with m buyers who want to buy goods in N . Assume that for good of type i ∈ N , the number of units available is given by a positive integer u(i). We denote the set of buyers by B = {1, 2, . . . , m}. For b ∈ B, let f b : Z n → R ∪ {−∞} be a valuation function of buyer b. We assume that dom f b is bounded and satisfies
and f b is monotone nondecreasing in the effective domain, i.e., f b (x) ≤ f b (y) whenever x, y ∈ dom f b and x ≤ y. 
We say that a pair ({x *
and a (non-negative) price vector p * ∈ R n + is a Walrasian equilibrium if it satisfies the following conditions:
The vector p * ∈ R n + is called a Walrasian equilibrium price vector. In the case of the model with multi-unit valuation functions, the condition (GS) is not sufficient to show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. Example 8.1. We show an example of multi-unit valuation functions satisfying (GS) for which a Walrasian equilibrium does not exist. This example is essentially the same as the one in Milgrom and Strulovici [24, Section 1] .
Let u = (2, 1) and
given as in 
where the second equality is by x *
. We see that x * 1 = (1, 1) and x * 2 = (1, 0) are the unique vectors maximizing the value f 1 (x *
For these vectors, we have
Hence, there exists no p * ∈ R 2 satisfying both of
This example shows that some stronger condition than (GS) is required to guarantee the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium. Below we show that if valuation functions satisfy a strong gross substitutes condition such as (GS&LAD), then a Walrasian equilibrium exists. Proof is given at the end of this section. 
n and the condition (GS). Then, there exists a Walrasian equilibrium. Based on the theorem above, we assume to the end of this section that valuation functions
are concave-extensible and satisfy the condition (GS&LAD). This implies that each f b is M ♮ -concave by Theorem 4.1 (i). We next discuss how to compute a Walrasian equilibrium. For this purpose, we define a new function L :
The function L is called the Lyapunov function [1] . Note that L is a polyhedral convex function since each function f
The Lyapunov function is useful in finding a Walrasian equilibrium, due to the following properties. Proof is given at the end of this section.
Theorem 8.3. Suppose that valuation functions
are concaveextensible and satisfy the condition (GS&LAD).
+ is a Walrasian equilibrium price vector if and only if it is a minimizer of Lyapunov function
♮ -convex function and has an integral minimizer. In the following, we assume that each f b is an integer-valued function. Then, Theorem 8.3 implies that the problem of finding a Walrasian equilibrium price vector can be reduced to the problem of finding an integral minimizer of the Lyapunov function. Since the Lyapunov function is integral polyhedral L ♮ -convex by Theorem 8.3 (iii), we can obtain an integral minimizer by the following algorithm, which is an application of the algorithm L ♮ Steepest Ascent Up in Section 3.3 to the function −L.
Algorithm Find Equilibrium
Step0:
, then output p and stop.
Step3: Set p := p + χ X and go to Step 1.
In the literature of auctions, however, it is often assumed that the access to buyers' valuation functions is impossible since valuation functions contain buyers' private information. Instead, it is often assumed that the information about the demand correspondences D(f b , p) is available. Even in such a case, we can still apply the algorithm Find Equilibrium to find an equilibrium by evaluating the difference of function values 
this equation follows from some known results in discrete convex analysis. See [1] and the full-paper version of [33] for more details on the implementation issues. 
To show the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium, we prove that there exists some nonnegative vector p * ∈ R n such that 
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Kelso and Crawford [21] showed the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the setting of single-unit valuation functions with the condition (GS) (Theorem 8.2 (ii)), and presented an algorithm (more precisely, an auction procedure) to compute a Walrasian equilibrium. Danilov, Koshevoy, and Murota [9] showed the existence of a Walrasian equilibrium in the case of multi-unit valuation functions by using M ♮ -concavity (cf. Theorem 8.2 (i)); moreover they proved the existence in a more general model with producers in addition to buyers.
The algorithm for computing an equilibrium shown in this section is essentially the same as the auction procedure by Ausubel [1] , which can be seen as a reformulation of an auction procedure by Gul and Stacchetti [18] . The algorithm works if we can obtain the information of buyers' demand correspondences D(f b , p), even if we do not know the function values of f b (see Ausubel [1] ). In the case where buyers' valuation functions are directly accessible, we can alternatively use an algorithm of Murota and Tamura [34] based on the reduction to the M-convex submodular flow problem.
Conclusion
In this paper, we surveyed the relationships among Kelso and Crawford's gross substitutes condition (GS), other variants of gross substitutes condition, and discrete concavity, where multi-unit valuation functions were mainly considered. We also reviewed various characterizations and properties of these concepts.
In Section 4, the condition (GS) and its variants such as (PRJ-GS), (SWGS), (GS&LAD), and (SS) were presented, and their connection with the concept of M ♮ -concavity in discrete convex analysis was discussed. We also gave characterizations of gross substitutes valuation functions in terms of the polyhedral properties of their concave closures such as (1DLD), (1DLD ′ ), and (LD). The single improvement condition (SI) and its stronger variant (SSI) were considered in Section 5, where the relationships with gross substitutes conditions were discussed.
We discussed in Section 6 the relationships between gross substitutes conditions and submodularity, which is recognized as an important property in mathematical economics. It was shown that gross substitutes conditions imply submodularity, and a characterization of gross substitutes conditions using submodularity was provided.
In Section 7, we investigated the structure of gross substitutes valuation functions from the viewpoint of indirect utility functions, and gave some characterizations. In particular, we showed that gross substitutes conditions for a valuation function can be characterized by another kind of discrete convexity called L ♮ -convexity for the associated indirect utility function.
As an application of the results presented in this paper, the existence and computation of a Walrasian equilibrium were discussed in Section 8. It was shown that the assumption of gross substitutes conditions implies the existence of an equilibrium and makes it possible to compute an equilibrium by applying a steepest descent algorithm to the Lyapunov function.
In this survey, we mainly put emphasis on mathematical properties and characterizations of gross substitutes conditions. It is known that gross substitutes conditions for valuation functions also provide various nice algorithmic properties; a typical example is the computation of a Walrasian equilibrium discussed in Section 8, where a strong gross substitutes condition plays a crucial role. For readers who are interested in algorithmic aspects of gross substitutes conditions as well as other related concepts, we suggest an (unpublished) paper by Paes Leme [36] which is available online. 
Hence, the value φ ′ ((λ, µ); +χ 1 ) is nondecreasing with respect to µ ∈ [0, 1), which implies (A.2). A.2. Proofs of Theorems 3.15 and 3. 16 We first prove Theorem 3.16, and then Theorem 3.15.
A polyhedron S ⊆ R n is called distributive [11] if for every x, y ∈ S we have x ∧ y, x ∨ y ∈ S. Hence, the condition (ii) in Theorem 3.16 can be restated as follows:
(ii) every linearity domain of f is a distributive polyhedron. A polyhedral characterization of distributive polyhedra is shown by Felsner and Knauer [11] . Theorem A.1 (Felsner and Knauer [11, Theorem 4] ). A polyhedron S ⊆ R n is distributive if and only if it can be represented by a system of inequalities of the form a ⊤ x ≤ b with a vector a ∈ R n satisfying |supp + (a)| ≤ 1 and |supp − (a)| ≤ 1 and b ∈ R. We give a proof of Theorem 3.16. The equivalence between (ii) and (iii) is immediate from Theorem A.1. In the following, we prove the implications "(i) =⇒ (ii)" and "(iii) =⇒ (i)," where the proofs are similar to those for the corresponding statements in Theorem 3.14. We now prove the submodularity of g. Since dom g is n-dimensional, (n−1)-dimensional linearity domains of g have one-to-one correspondence to 1-dimensional linearity domains of f , and an (n − 1)-dimensional linearity domain of g is orthogonal to a vector a ∈ R n if and only if the corresponding 1-dimensional linearity domain of f is parallel to the vector a. Hence, the assumption for f implies that every (n − 1)-dimensional linearity domain of g is orthogonal to a vector a ∈ R n satisfying |supp + (a)| ≤ 1 and |supp − (a)| ≤ 1. This implies the condition (iii) in Theorem 3.16, and therefore function g is submodular by Theorem 3.16.
